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ABSTRACT 
This paper discusses computer worm detection using machine learning. More 
specifically, the generalization capability of autoencoders is investigated and 
improved using regularization and deep autoencoders. Models are constructed first 
without autoencoders and thereafter with autoencoders. The models with 
autoencoders are further improved using regularization and deep autoencoders. 
Results show an improved in the capability of models to generalize well to new 
examples. 
Keywords: Computer worm detection, generalization capability of machine 
learnings, autoencoders, deep autoencoders, regularization   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Computer and network resources are important for the operational effectiveness 
and efficiency of organizations. These resources may also be leveraged for 
competitiveness. A number of critical threats exist that could hamper these benefits. 
The most prevalent threats and attacks reported by pre-eminent security 
organizations include worms, botnets, Trojans, ransomware, spam, phishing, web 
attackers and crypto-miners [1]. 
This study has as its scope computer worm detection using machine learning in 
an organization’s network. More specifically, the study investigates and reduces 
generalization error of the detection model using autoencoders. In [2], they defines a 
computer worm as a process that can cause a (possibly evolved) copy of it to execute 
on a remote computational machine. Worms self-propagate across computer 
networks by exploiting security or policy-flaws in widely used network services. 
Unlike computer viruses, worms do not require user intervention to propagate nor do 
they piggy-back on existing files. Their spread is very rapid [3,4] with the ability to 
infect as many as 359,000 computers in under 14 hours, or even faster. Computer 
worm defence involves prevention and detection. Prevention may not always be 
wholly possible due to inherent vulnerability in all systems. The approach this study 
takes is to profile and detect attacks. Once detection has happened other mitigation 
measures may be taken. 
A number of approaches for computer worm detection have been reviewed in 
literature. These include content-based signature schemes, anomaly detection 
schemes and behavioral-signature based detection. Approaches that utilized machine 
learning have particularly yielded good results [5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12]. Machine 
learning has been defined as a field of study that gives computers the ability to learn 
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without being explicitly programmed [13]. The use of machine learning can help 
correlate events, identify patterns and detect anomalous behavior to improve the 
security posture of any defence program [14]. The studies that are most similar to 
the present study are here reviewed. 
There exist a few studies that are most similar to the present work [15,16, 17]. In 
[15], they use auto-encoders for dimensionality reduction and feature extraction. 
Auto-encoders are unsupervised learning algorithms and do not require labels for 
training. Three Deep Neural Networks (DNN) were used with the features extracted 
from the Auto- encoders and an accuracy of 99.21% obtained. The present study 
deviates from this approach by using the Auto-encoders to achieve generalization of 
the model and not accuracy alone. 
Another study that also comes close is that by [16] who propose a deep learning 
architecture using stacked auto-encoders with input being windows portable 
executable programming interface (API) calls extracted from the windows portable 
executable (PE) files. It uses unsupervised feature learning then supervised fine-
tuning. The model outperforms Artificial Neural Networks (ANN), Support Vector 
Machines (SVM), Naive Bayes (NB) and Decision Trees (DT). Again, 
generalization error is not investigated. In [17], they use deep belief networks 
(DBNs) implemented with a deep-stack of de-noising auto-encoders generating an 
invariant compact representation of the malware behavior. The study claims 98.6% 
accuracy in classifying new malware variants. As before, generalization error is not 
investigated. Other studies use slightly different approaches. Then, in [18] they 
propose using two DNNs with the first limited to only determining if the traffic is 
normal or suspicious and the second classifying the traffic as a multi-class problem.  
In [19], they use convolution neural networks for detection based on image 
similarity and claims an accuracy of 98%. [20] investigate the class imbalance 
problem with methods like random sampling and cluster-based sampling. They use 
auto-encoders for dimensional reduction. In their work, Random Forest outperforms 
deep neural networks with a claimed accuracy of 99.78%. Then, in [21] they train 
convolutional neural networks (CNN) translating the malware classification into an 
image classification. An accuracy of 99.97% is claimed. In [22], they trains a CNN 
on dynamic behavioral features of the PE files (n-grams used to create images) to 
detect and classify obscure malware. An accuracy of 97.97% is claimed. In [23], 
they use SVM to perform clustering as well as dimensionality reduction. In [24], 
they use Independent component analysis (ICA) to separate features extracted from 
network traces into two estimated distributions of malware and benign traffic. In 
[25], they uses K-Means clustering algorithm and thereafter performs boosting using 
Genetic Algorithm. In [26], they explains that the fundamental goal of machine 
learning is to generalize beyond the examples in the training set. It would be useful 
to investigate the generalization capability of the learners. Last, in [27], they 
discusses a number of ways of reducing the generalization error including stopping 
the training as soon as performance on a validation dataset starts to get worse, 
introducing weight penalties of various kinds such as L1 and L2 regularization 
(sparse autoencoder), and drop out among others. Dropout refers to dropping out 
units (visible and hidden) in a neural network. The choice of which units to drop is 
random. They explain that dropout can be interpreted as a way of regularization by 
adding noise to a neural network’s hidden units. Other ways of reducing the 
generalization error include limiting the number of nodes in the hidden layer of the 
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network (undercomplete autoencoder) and adding random noise to the inputs and 
letting the autoencoder recover the original noise free data (denoising autoencoder). 
 
 
2. MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
2.1 DATASETS 
 
The datasets used for the experiments were requested and obtained from the 
University San Diego California Center for Applied Data Analysis (USCD CAIDA). 
The center operates a network telescope that consists of a globally rooted /8 network 
that monitors large segments of lightly used address space. There is little legitimate 
traffic in this address space hence it provides a monitoring point for anomalous 
traffic that represents almost 1/256th of all IPv4 destination addresses on the 
Internet. 
Two sets of datasets were requested and obtained from this telescope. The first is 
the Three days of Conficker Dataset [28] containing data for the three days between 
November 2008 and January 2009 during which Conficker worm attack (Emile, 
2009) was active. This dataset contains 68 compressed packet capture (pcap) files 
each containing one hour of traces. The pcap files only contain packet headers with 
the payload having been removed to preserve privacy. The destination IP addresses 
have also been masked for the same reason. The other dataset is the Two Days in 
November 2008 dataset [29] with traces for the 12th and 19th November 2008, 
containing two typical days of background radiation just prior to the detection of 
Conficker. 
The datasets were processed using the CAIDA Corsaro software suite, a 
software suite for performing large-scale analysis of trace data. The raw pcap 
datasets were aggregated into the FlowTuple format. This format retains only 
selected fields from captured packets instead of the whole packet, enabling a more 
efficient data storage, processing and analysis. The 8 fields are source IP address, 
destination IP address, source port, destination port, protocol, Time to Live, TCP 
flags, IP packet length and Value which represents the number of packets in the 
interval whose header fields match this FlowTuple key. The instances in the Three 
Days of Conficker dataset have been further filtered to retain only instances that 
have a high likelihood of being attributable to Conficker worm attack. In [29], they 
discusses Conficker’s TCP scanning behavior (searching for victims to exploit) and 
indicates that it engages in three types of observable network scanning via TCP port 
445 or 139 (where the vulnerable Microsoft software Windows Server service runs) 
for additional victims. The vulnerability allowed attackers to execute arbitrary code 
via a crafted RPC request that triggers a buffer overflow. These include local 
network scanning where Conficker determines the broadcast domain from network 
interface settings, scans host nearby other infected hosts and random scanning. 
Other distinguishing characteristics include TTL within reasonable distance from 
Windows default TTL of 128, incremental source port in the Windows default range 
of 1024-5000, 2 or I TCP SYN packets per connection attempt instead of the usual 3 
TCP SYN packets per connection attempt due to TCP’s retransmit behavior. 
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2.2 MACHINE LEARNING EXPERIMENTS 
 
Pandas library [30] was used for the machine learning experiments. The number 
of instances was originally 2000 with the variables as 130. These variables included 
source port, destination port, protocol, time to live (TTL), IP packet length, Value 
(the number of instances whose signature are similar), packet source country, well 
known source and destination ports, among others.  The variables had integer 
values. The examples were then split into train and test sets using the train_test_split 
function with the proportion of 0.33 and stratify sampling. For modeling, the keras 
library [31] was used. The first model was built using an input dimension of 130 and 
ReLu activation function (Rectified Linear Activation) and 9 nodes. For the output 
layer the model had 130 neurons and the sigmoid function for the activation. The 
model type chosen was Sequential. This was an easy way to build a model and 
allowed building the model layer by layer. Dense was the layer type used. Dense is a 
standard layer type that works for most cases. In a dense layer, all nodes in the 
previous layer connect to the nodes in the current layer. The activation function 
allows the model to take into account nonlinear relationships. For the loss function, 
binary_crossentropy was used. The metrics used was accuracy. For training the 
model, the fit () function was used with the following parameters:  training dataset, 
validation dataset, 50 epochs and a batch size of 32. The training and validation loss 
models were then plotted. The second model to be built was with activity 
regularization included. L1 regularization was used. The regularizers class from 
keras library was used. ReLu and sigmoid activations were used for the layers. For 
model compilation, binary_crossentropy loss function was used together with adam 
optimizer and accuracy metrics. The training and validation loss models were again 
plotted. The third model built was using deep autoencoders. The input dimension 
was still 130 but with 9,6,4 nodes for the hidden layers and 130 nodes for the output 
layer. The ReLu and sigmoid activation functions were again used. The results are 
presented and discussed in Section 3. 
 
 
3. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Before using autoencoders, the neural network model plotted was as shown in 
Figure 1. Models were then built using autoencoders to attempt to improve the 
generalization ability. The second model built without using regularization or deep 
autoencoders gave the result as illustrated in Figure 2. 
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FIGURE 1. Training and validation loss for the neural network model without 
regularization 
The validation loss curve drops and then rises again. This shows over-fitting. The 
model does not generalize well to new examples.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. Train and validation accuracy plots for shallow autoencoder 
The accuracies reported were high for both training and validation. The validation 
fluctuations were narrowed hence an improved model. The number of epochs before 
which the accuracy was flat is about 5. With sparsity constraint, the model was 
slightly smoothened out. The results reported were as shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Train and validation accuracies for a model with sparsity constraint 
The last model developed was one with deep autoencoders. The results are as 
illustrated in Figure 4. Very high accuracies were realized and the train and test 
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curves were almost in sync. The generalization capability of the model is hence 
greatly improved. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4. Training and Test accuracies for deep autoencoder 
 
 
4.  CONCLUSION 
 
This study sought to investigate and improve the generalization capability of 
autoencoders for the detection of computer worms. A literature discussion of similar 
studies was first presented. It was evident that many studies had left out the critical 
element of generalization performance capability hence the need for this study. 
Models were developed first with no autoencoders and later with autoencoders and 
with sparsity constraints and also with deep autoencoders. Results presented show 
improved model performance in terms of generalization. Future studies can be done 
to compare models based on a combination of parameters such as accuracy and 
generalization ability. In addition, more measures to improve generalization ability 
can be investigated and empirical evidence adduced. 
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